





In reading journalistic and some academic
accounts of the Bougainville conflict, I have been
struck by two weaknesses. First is a tendency to
emphasise only those events immediately
leading up to the outbreak of violence in 1988, to
the neglect of significant issues originating
decades earlier. Second is a picture of a monolithic,
homogenous ‘Bougainville’, ignoring both past
and present divisions among the population.
Both weaknesses can be addressed by focusing
on speakers of a language labelled Nasioi, who
claim the land on which the Bougainville copper
mine was developed; who have consistently
provided a strong voice for secession from what
is now the nation-state of Papua New Guinea;
and who furnished the core personnel and most
prominent leadership of the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army. Their history in the
twentieth century has been distinctive, and is
worth comparing and contrasting with those of
the other language groups on Bougainville and
Buka islands. My comments are based primarily
on my experiences living intermittently with
Nasioi speakers from 1962 to 1978, with the
opportunity to see at close range the lives they
led before and after the development of the giant
copper mine.
Nasioi is the term given to this language
by a German Marist missionary at the beginning
of the century. The language is related to three
others spoken in the southern part of the island
but to no other. Matthew Spriggs (1997) has
made a convincing argument that ancestors of
Nasioi speakers arrived millennia before settlers
ancestral to speakers of quite unrelated
languages to the north. Thus one might argue
that some of the present cultural divisions among
Bougainville’s population have long roots indeed.
But there is no evidence that Nasioi-
speakers saw themselves as any sort of united
group at the beginning of this century. They lived
in environments stretching from the coast inland
to mountains 900 metres above sea level. These
different environments called for different
adaptations, therefore variations in social life.
Coastal Nasioi had access to salt, the products of
the sea and sago palms; those living in valleys
easily grew coconuts and taro; mountain
dwellers used forest products for bows, arrows,
and carrying utensils. Villagers exchanged what
they produced for what their own environments
did not provide.
Furthermore, people in the varied parts of
this territory had different kinds of contact with
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other groups: coastal Nasioi faced raids from the
Solomon Islands to the south; mountain dwellers
in the Kongara region dealt, and sometimes
intermarried, with neighbouring Nagovisi-
speakers; those in the Koromira area were subject
to influence from the rather different political
organisation of Buin-speakers to the south.
Despite these variations, it is possible
without too much simplification to draw a
picture of Nasioi social life at the time when
outsiders settled on their land. Their settlements
were small—not more than a few households—
and scattered over the landscape. The household
of a married couple was the unit producing basic
subsistence needs, but each Nasioi also belonged
to a larger kinship group, a clan. One belonged to
the clan of one’s mother, and one should choose a
spouse from a different clan. Certain kin were
favoured as marriage partners, and the practice
tended to produce a continuing relationship
between two clans exchanging spouses over
generations. However, members of any single
clan lived in settlements scattered over the
territory, and the entire membership never joined
together for political or social action.
Rights to garden land were primarily
inherited through the female line. Because of the
importance of women in the kinship and
inheritance system, and in providing basic
subsistence needs, relations between the sexes
tended to be complementary, rather than
hierarchical. In contrast to many other parts of
Papua New Guinea, Nasioi women had status
and rights comparable to those of men.
This absence of strict social ranking was
general in Nasioi society when outsiders first
arrived. There were no chiefs like those found in
some other parts of the Pacific. Rather, villagers
recognised what anthropologists often call ‘big
men’. These individuals established their
influence by hard work, generosity (especially in
giving feasts), and knowledge of local affairs.
They did not have widespread authority to
command others. If a big man became too
overbearing, other villagers might simply move
away from him, since land for gardens was
relatively plentiful. Because no individual or
group could wield much authority over others,
one of the sanctions that enforced social harmony
was fear that an offended person might work
sorcery on someone guilty of anti-social behaviour.
A guiding principle of all social life was
that interactions between individuals or between
groups should balance. The marriage pattern in
which two clans exchanged brides and grooms
over time is an example of this principle of
balanced exchange.
The exception to this notion of balance
and relative equality came in the area of
traditional religion. Nasioi believed in the
superiority of ancestral spirits who could aid
them in everyday activities. Though they
recognised the need for energy and skill in
producing the necessities of life, they did not
think real success was possible without
supernatural help from these spirits. Special
qualities of individuals, like the ability to heal or
perform sorcery, were also believed to derive
from such help. Villagers entreated spirits for
their assistance by making gifts of valuable food
like pork, which they set out in small household
shrines.
These practices and attitudes were still
shaping Nasioi behavior in 1962, despite all the
changes that began when outsiders contacted
them. This continuity can be seen—for example,
in rhetoric employed by the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (BRA)—down to the present
time.
When Imperial Germany and Great
Britain carved up the Southwest Pacific in the
late nineteenth century, Bougainville was
included in what was called German New
Guinea, drawing an artificial political boundary
which constitutes one root of modern secessionist
unrest. One factor making Nasioi particularly
subject to coloniser invasion was a good natural
harbour at Kieta, where the first European
settlers entered Bougainville. These were Roman
Catholic missionaries arriving in 1902. In 1905,
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in Kieta, and other Europeans began to establish
coconut plantations on Nasioi land from 1905.
Although Australia became the colonial
power ruling Nasioi and the rest of what had
been German New Guinea after the First World
War, the colonial situation which Germans had
created remained much the same for more than
thirty years. This took the form of a particular
kind of political economy, based on plantations
producing copra (see Ogan 1996). Bougainville’s
rich volcanic soil, together with Kieta’s harbour,
made the Nasioi area particularly attractive for
plantations. It was not difficult for prospective
planters to ‘buy’ Nasioi land cheaply, because
villagers had no concept of a sale that
permanently alienated such a basic resource. Nor
could they foresee that the future might bring a
shortage, since land had apparently always been
abundant for their needs.
Indeed, planters acquired more land than
they could easily develop because conditions like
endemic malaria precluded the possibility of a
large European settlement on Bougainville. What
was a persistent problem for planters was
obtaining an adequate labour supply. The
understaffed colonial administration could not
force Nasioi to work, and there were few
incentives for villagers to enter a money
economy, so long as they could meet their basic
needs through traditional subsistence activities.
Only the desire for imported goods could
persuade Nasioi to undertake employment.
The best solution that planters could find
was adopting copra as the basic plantation crop.
In contrast to sugar, for example, copra
production does not need a highly trained or
well-organised labour force in order to be
profitable. The tasks required are simple and can
be performed in a relatively casual manner. From
a Nasioi point of view, the presence of
plantations on their land was as much a source of
confusion as of anything that might be called
‘economic development’. Plantation work did not
educate, but rather raised questions. Who were
these strangers with such unfamiliar wealth as
metal tools, kerosene lanterns and tinned food,
and what was the source of their power?
Unlike planters, missionaries saw their
goal as bringing salvation, but inevitably they
changed traditional life, often with unintended
consequences. For the first twenty years of
colonialism, missionary efforts were in the hands
of Roman Catholics. Later, Methodists and
Seventh-Day Adventists entered the area,
creating new divisions among the Nasioi. These
were not so severe as the mission rivalries to the
south, because most Nasioi were nominally
converted to Catholicism. It is clear that Nasioi
tended to interpret missionary teachings in terms
of their original world view. God, Jesus and the
Virgin Mary were seen as a kind of super-
ancestral spirit, and could be asked for practical
benefits as villagers had done in the past. Yet
missionaries, like planters and administrative
officers, enjoyed a material life style which
remained tantalisingly out of Nasioi reach. Nor
were missionaries always free of the race
prejudice that was more commonly expressed by
other colonisers. All colonisers brought with
them European ideas of male dominance as well,
and the status of Nasioi women suffered
accordingly.
Nothing could have been less like
traditional social life that the kinds of inequalities
created by plantation colonialism, but this did
not mean that all earlier patterns of behaviour
and belief were simply extinguished.
Plantation colonialism thus disturbed
Nasioi life without bringing the improvements
that villagers sought, especially in their material
standard of living. This situation lasted more
than thirty years, until the Second World War
brought new invaders. As soon as Japanese
forces bombed New Britain, the small coloniser
community around Kieta began to flee the island.
This abrupt departure had a demoralising effect
on Nasioi, who had been led to believe that these
Europeans were so much more knowledgeable
and powerful than they.
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Once again Kieta’s harbour made the
Nasioi area a natural point for invasion and
occupation. Villages and individuals tried
different strategies for dealing with these
invaders, although all choices had the same goal,
survival. Some Nasioi cooperated with the
Japanese as fully as they could. Others secretly
assisted the few Europeans, like coastwatchers,
who remained behind. These wartime divisions
were not forgotten in the immediate postwar era.
Because Bougainville was a major
Japanese base, the island was subject to heavy
bombing by American planes, and the island as a
whole, along with East New Britain and the
Sepik, was deemed to have suffered more than
any other part of what is now Papua New
Guinea. Bombing not only harmed villagers
directly but drove them from their gardens to
seek shelter wherever they could find it. As
people said in the 1960s, ‘We lived in the bush
like wild pigs’. Children and pregnant women
suffered the most, and the postwar population
distribution was skewed as a result. In late 1943,
American forces landed on the west coast of
Bougainville. Once an Allied base had been
established, Nasioi joined other Bougainvilleans
visiting the camps, attracted by the stories of
food and supplies they heard could be obtained
from the generous troops.
Australian administration was restored in
1946. When the Mandated Territory became a
United Nations Trust Territory, it continued to
include Bougainville, though islanders had never
seen themselves as truly connected with the rest
of that political unit.
Nasioi had already become disillusioned
with decades of a colonial experience that
seemed to disrupt their lives without improving
them. Their abandonment by their former
colonial ‘masters’, followed by wartime suffering,
added to their dissatisfaction. As village men
were fond of saying in the 1960s
When my grandfather was alive and my
father just a little boy, the Germans came.
They gave us steel axes and laplaps. Then
the Australians came and drove away the
Germans. Then the Japanese came and drove
away the Australians. Then the Americans
drove away the Japanese so the Australians
could come back. Now my grandfather is
dead, my father is an old man, and I am a
grown man. And what do we have? Nothing
more than steel axes and laplaps.
I cannot emphasise too strongly that the
disillusion and disaffection with the colonial
experience, together with sentiments that
recognised connections with the Solomon Islands
rather than New Guinea, were widespread
among Nasioi before 1964.
Nasioi began to express their
disenchantment with colonialism in a variety of
ways soon after Australian administration was
re-established, as planters and missionaries also
returned to the Kieta area. They were no longer
willing to work on plantations in return for the
kind of treatment they had received in the past,
increasing mutual resentment between planter
and villager. Plantations that had existed on
Nasioi land using Nasioi labour for decades had
to import workers from other parts of New
Guinea. As Jill Nash and I have written
elsewhere (1990), this first-hand contact with
people they came to call ‘redskins’ was important
in creating a new sense of Nasioi and ultimately
Bougainvillean identity.
Administration policy changed
considerably in the war. Great emphasis was
placed on ‘development’. Though this
particularly meant economic development, it
included more government expenditures on
education, which had in the past been left in the
hands of missions. At the same time United
Nations pressure to move the Territory toward
independence increased. To Nasioi it seemed that
the administration was more intrusive than ever,
just when villagers were less willing to believe
that such interference was to their benefit.
However, the removal of District Headquarters
from Kieta north to the island of Sohano, and
policies that concentrated on the recently opened
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something more like benign neglect.
A majority of Nasioi simply refused to
participate in administration-sponsored projects.
These included local government councils and
cash-crop producers’ cooperative societies. They
also resented (though they could not resist
without open rebellion) new public health efforts
like spraying villages to get rid of malaria-
carrying mosquitoes.
In the early 1960s, Nasioi had not yet
organised themselves to carry out effective
political or economic action. Rather, many
villagers were seeking more supernatural
solutions to their problems. Small groups would
try to combine economic efforts like cash
cropping and trade store management with
religious practices, that joined traditional with
missionary ideals and rituals. These groups were
attacked by administration as ‘cargo cults’, and
leaders were sometimes jailed. Though
ineffective from an outsider’s viewpoint, this
response—which Nasioi themselves called in Tok
Pisin ‘longlong lotu’ or ‘crazy church’—did focus
diffuse resentment, and helped link villages in a
way that traditional political organisation had
not.
A more recognisably political response
came in 1962, when a United Nations fact-finding
team visited Kieta. At a public meeting, some
Nasioi braved coloniser anger by asking the
United Nations to remove Australia as
administering authority, and to substitute the
United States. This proposal reflected memories
of American troops’ wartime generosity with
food and supplies. It also showed that many
Nasioi still believed outside help, rather than
their own efforts, was necessary to achieve their
goals. Typically, Nasioi were not united on the
issue; others were equally outspoken in favour of
continuing Australian control.
In 1964 Australian geologists began
searching for minerals on Nasioi land, where
small-scale gold mining had existed before the
Second World War. I want only to highlight here
what seem to me key points. First, the Australian
laws on mining, which had been introduced into
the Mandated Territory in the 1920s and gave
subsurface mineral rights to the state, were
unknown to Nasioi and not in accordance with
their own ideas of land rights (for example, clay
for pottery was understood to belong to whoever
had ultimate gardening rights).
Second, the agreement to develop the
mine was negotiated between Australian civil
servants, acting as trustees for the Territory, and
high-priced lawyers employed by the multi-
national firm Rio Tinto Zinc. No Nasioi was ever
consulted in these negotiations.
This agreement had to be ratified by the
first democratically elected House of Assembly in
Papua New Guinea. When debate began, it
appeared that only those landowners directly
affected by construction of the mine and
associated facilities would receive any payment
at all. This would be compensation for loss of
land at the rate of one Australian pound per acre
per year, plus compensation for loss of crops and
other property at rates to be decided in a Mining
Warden Court. At that time, there was only one
Bougainville Member in the House, not a Nasioi,
Paul (later Sir Paul) Lapun. Over the opposition
of the official members but with the support of
those who were willing to compromise to get this
incredible project up and running, he succeeded
in obtaining a royalty for the landowners. There
was considerable confusion about this royalty of
5 per cent, and at least one member who voted
for it later admitted he was surprised to learn the
actual maths involved. Landowner royalty was
established at 5 per cent—not of the value of
minerals produced, but of the government’s
royalty of 1.25 per cent of that value. In other
words, Nasioi were to receive a little more than 6
cents per A$100 of the value of minerals taken
from their land. The amended mining agreement
was unanimously approved by the House in
August 1967.
Construction of the mine and associated
facilities from 1968 to 1972 was a remarkable
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technological achievement, but I want here to
emphasise some of the social consequences.
When the total population of Bougainville may
have been less than 80,000 (Nasioi making up
perhaps 14,000 of that total), some 10,000
construction workers from all over the world,
including the main island of New Guinea,
flooded into the Kieta area and inland to the
mine site. This invasion transformed a peaceful
part of the island to a place where public
drunkenness, violence, and attempts to obtain
sexual favours from Nasioi women were all too
common.
Land leased for the mine by Bougainville
Copper Limited (BCL) amounted to more than
32,000 acres. Small villages had to be relocated.
Additional land was taken over by the
administration for new towns and other facilities.
Loss of Nasioi land was felt even more keenly in
the face of a rapidly growing population. After
wartime losses, improved medical care and other
factors had boosted natural population growth to
an estimated 4 per cent per year, one of the
highest rates in the world. Nasioi themselves had
also reduced the amount of available garden land
by planting cash crops of coconut and cacao. By
the early 1970s even unsophisticated village folk
at some distance from the mine began to
appreciate the increased pressure of so many
young people. At the mine site itself, women said
‘We weep for what is being done to our land’.
Perhaps it is worth underscoring here
that, while almost all Nasioi resented the mine,
the degree of that resentment varied with
geographic distance. Those in the valleys farther
south saw the mine as just one more example of
outsider oppression; those in the mountains were
truly outraged.
Two new significant points can be stated
briefly: first, despite all the early statements from
BCL about the consideration being given to
preserve the environment, such brute facts as the
massive pollution of the entire Jaba/Kawerong
river system forced admission by the 1980s that
irreversible damage had been done and that the
Panguna area could never be restored to
agriculture.
Second, the much trumpeted—and indeed
laudable from a national point of view—
renegotiation of the original mining agreement in
1974 greatly increased revenues for soon-to-be-
independent Papua New Guinea but added
nothing to income received by Nasioi who bore
the brunt of all the environmental and social
damage.
However, BCL had learned that they had
to deal more directly with Nasioi individuals and
groups, as well as—or instead of—with central
government, since the firm was guided by
‘bottom line’ considerations of profitability,
rather than ideology. They attempted to lower
their wage bill by localising the mine’s workforce
as much as possible, though Nasioi were less
willing to accept BCL employment than were
other Papua New Guineans. BCL provided
finance and assistance to Nasioi who wanted to
set up small businesses like trucking, and Nasioi
together with other islanders might take
advantage of education and training schemes
financed by the company. Many new forms of
compensation to Nasioi were directly negotiated
by BCL.
Ironically, these new sources of income
increased the dissatisfaction many Nasioi felt,
because the financial rewards were distributed
according to Western legal practice, in sharp
contrast to the traditional values of a social life
based on balanced exchanges that spread benefits
more or less equally. New social divisions
developed among the Nasioi themselves,
particularly between the generations which had
been affected in different ways by the mine, as
well as by other social changes like cash cropping
and new educational opportunities.
Let’s step back a moment and trace the
changes Nasioi have made toward more
recognisably political responses to new
conditions. Many resisted the idea of the first
House of Assembly election in 1964, because they
associated it with local government councils.
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from another language group, rejecting the
Nasioi candidates. At that time, villagers often
emphasised their choice’s experience as a former
Catholic seminarian, suggesting that he had
supernatural knowledge that could help them.
Nasioi learned more about modern
politics from Lapun, but also now from younger
islanders who took advantage of new
educational opportunities. In the 1968 election,
they overwhelmingly voted for the incumbent
Lapun, although they did not necessarily
understand or approve his role in obtaining a
landowner royalty. The increase in Bougainville
representation from one to three—none Nasioi—
provided greater visibility in Port Moresby, but
the Members soon began to take different
positions on important issues.
Lapun was a key figure in the formation
of the organisation called Napidakoe Navitu,
centered in Kieta (see Griffin 1982). This was the
most modern political body in which Nasioi had
participated as a majority up to that time. New
electoral boundaries in the 1972 election meant
that Nasioi could not vote for Lapun, but his
endorsement of Father John Momis and his
association with Navitu led most Nasioi to vote
for the former in the Regional contest, and for
one or the other of the two candidates claiming
Navitu affiliation in the Central Bougainville
Open race. Note that none of the candidates
receiving major Nasioi support were of that
language group.
When Papua New Guinea became
independent in 1975, a new cry for Bougainville
secession arose, with angry demonstrations in
Kieta. According to everything I have learned,
Nasioi were the strongest supporters of this
movement, though they did not provide its
leadership. The consequent establishment of a
North Solomons Province has been well analysed
in Political Decentralisation in a New State (May
and Regan 1997) and I only wish to underline
one point: the mining royalty originally given to
the central government was transferred to the
Provincial Government, but this did not directly
affect Nasioi landowners.
Few of Bougainville’s political spokesmen
who emerged in the 1970s were Nasioi. I believe
this reflects the inhibiting effect of the long
dominant colonial presence in and around Kieta.
However, this did not mean Nasioi were
quiescent, as resentment of the mine’s social and
environmental effects continued to grow. Review
of the mining agreement, scheduled for 1981, did
not take place, party because of general
landowner resistance to any further projects.
Divisions between central and Provincial
governments, and between the different
ideologies represented by Father Momis and Leo
Hannett were also involved (see Wesley-Smith
1992).
In what now can be seen as a highly
significant development, Nasioi around the mine
site created the Panguna Landowners
Association (PLA) to represent landowner
interests in negotiating with BCL (see Okole
1990). This suggests that both parties found it
advisable to work around, rather than through,
Port Moresby whenever possible. (However, it
should be noted that by 1980, BCL was paying
less attention to community relations than in the
early years of operation.) PLA succeeded in
obtaining a new compensation agreement which
provided increased benefits, as well as a new
structure including a trust fund to diversify
investments with funds which might otherwise
have gone to individuals. Despite these initial
successes, disagreements arose within the
Association, particularly between younger and
older members, over issues like distribution of
benefits.
A new group of younger, educated Nasioi
appeared to contest the leadership and policies of
PLA. One of these was a young woman, Perpetua
Serero, which suggests that the importance of
women in traditional life—at least at a symbolic
level—never completely disappeared under
colonial pressures. Representatives of this ‘new
PLA’ presented their grievances to consultants
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employed by BCL in 1988, but rejected the
consultants’ responses. From this point,
increasing violence spread from Nasioi territory
throughout Bougainville, violence that would
last almost a decade.
It is important to pinpoint where the
violence began. The first targets were mining
installations and equipment, blown up by
explosives stolen from BCL. This interrupted
operations, which were then resumed when
additional police were sent in to improve
security. Their attempts to arrest the alleged
ringleader, Francis Ona, a leader of the new PLA
and former BCL employee were unsuccessful.
Ona was also believed to have kidnapped and
murdered his uncle, Matthew Kove, active in the
older PLA group.
Continued attacks on BCL installations
caused the mine to close in May 1989. It should
be clear that the real escalation of the
Bougainville conflict—though the roots go back
for decades—came when the central government,
unable to tolerate the loss of mining revenues,
sent in the police mobile squad with the Papua
New Guinea Defence Force. No matter how
diffuse a political organisation people operate
with, nothing can unify them more effectively
than a common enemy. Of course, when the
enemy is so easily seen as physically different as
are ‘redskin’ troops, and behaves in such an
undisciplined and brutal manner as has been
reliably reported for both the police and the
Defence Force, the reaction will be even more
dramatic. Nor could anything bring forth more
quickly the secessionist sentiments that had been
present in varying degrees throughout the island
for years.
It is hard for me not to believe that the
entry of the PNG security forces and their
variably brutal and grotesquely ineffectual
activities created a qualitative change in a conflict
that might otherwise have taken a less
catastrophic course.
To conclude: I think ironies, contradictions
and complications are inherent in any colonial
and postcolonial situation. Here are some that lie
in the background and present manifestations of
the Bougainville Conflict.
• Linguistic divisions within the island’s
population go back to prehistoric settlement.
These were compounded by differences of
geography and physical environment, and
complicated by different interactions among
Bougainvilleans and with other islanders.
• Nasioi, who must be seen as key players
in events since mineral exploration in 1964,
possessed at the time of colonial settlement a
political organisation that was
extraordinarily atomistic and non-
hierarchical, even in comparison with other
Bougainvilleans.
• At the same time, in part because of the
natural harbour at Kieta, Nasioi were most
subject to all the forces of colonialism before
World War II and, in particular, the effects of
a political economy based on copra production.
• On one hand, plantation colonialism
made Nasioi and—to a lesser extent—other
Bougainvilleans aware of themselves as a
group in contrast to the coloniser. On the
other, competition between missions, and
varying strategies for dealing with colonisers
set up new divisions within Nasioi. Wartime
responses to Japanese invasion also
separated Nasioi, although all were most
concerned with simple survival.
• The long history of plantation colonialism
made Nasioi particularly disaffected,
disillusioned and ready for new solutions
including secession and/or joining with
Solomon Islands, years before mining
exploration.
• Although it can be argued that BCL
represents a much more ruthless kind of
exploitation than copra plantations, what
BCL did to increase its own profitability—
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education and training, muting racism in
favour of recognising Nasioi potential—had
the unintended consequence of creating
social and cultural resources for more
concerted political action than was
conceivable in a plantation economy. In this
sense, BCL could be said to have ensured the
degree of success that the BRA has enjoyed.
• Perception of a common enemy during
the last ten years has produced an
unprecedented sense of Bougainvillean
identity. But older divisions—whether
linguistic, mission affiliated, clan and
locality-related—have not simply
disappeared. To these have now been added
the allegiances created by the armed struggle
itself, as separate groups have chosen
different strategies for survival. Added to
this are the real and inevitable conflicts of
economic interest produced by increasing
disparities of wealth, whether related to the
mine, cash cropping or other new economic
opportunities. This division into haves and
have-nots is in turn related to a generational
conflict, separating younger from older,
educated from unschooled, and most
frightening of all, a cohort of youngsters who
have grown up knowing only violence as a
way of life. The lasting peace that so many of
us hope for must deal with the threat posed
by old and new divisions among
Bougainvilleans, while at the same time
reaching an accord with the rest of Papua
New Guinea.
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